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European Journal of International Security  
Vernacular imaginaries of European border security among citizens:  
From walls to information management 
 
Abstract 
Our primary aim in this article is to explore vernacular constructions of Europe’s so-
called ‘migration crisis’ from the grounded everyday perspectives of EU citizens. We 
do so as a critical counterpoint to dominant elite scripts of the crisis, which are often 
reliant upon securitized representations of public opinion as being overwhelmingly 
hostile to migrants and refugees and straightforwardly in favour of tougher deterrent 
border security. In addition to broadening the range of issues analysed in vernacular 
security studies, the article seeks to make three principal contributions. Theoretically, 
we argue for an approach to the study of citizens’ views and experiences of migration 
and border security that is sensitive to the performative effects of research methods 
and the circular logic between securitizing modes of knowledge production and policy 
justification. Methodologically, we outline and apply an alternative approach in 
response to these dynamics drawing on the potential of critical focus groups and a 
desecuritizing ethos. Empirically, we identify a vernacular theory of ‘the border’ as 
information management, and a significant information gap prevalent among 
participants with otherwise opposing views towards migration. These findings 
challenge bifurcated understandings of public opinion towards migration into Europe 
and point to the existence of vernacular border security imaginaries beyond either 
‘closed’ or ‘open’ borders. 
 
Key words 
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Introduction 
While Europe’s variously labelled ‘migration’, ‘refugee’, and/or ‘border’ crisis has 
receded from its apogee in autumn 2015 – largely due to the closure of the ‘Balkan 
route’ and the impact of the controversial European Union (EU)-Turkey agreement – 
many commentators argue that unauthorized migration into Europe remains one of the 
key security challenges facing European governments, economies, and societies in the 
opening decades of the twenty-first century.1 Against this backdrop, recent attention 
in the social sciences in general – and in the interdisciplinary sub-fields of security, 
border, and migration studies in particular – have understandably been drawn to 
problematizing the discourse of a single ‘crisis’ from the multiple and often 
competing perspectives of both Europe’s elite policy-making communities and the 
diverse experiences of migrants and refugees in countries of origin, en route via 
precarious sea and land crossings, and in reception and detention facilities upon 
arrival in Europe.2  
By contrast, other than prominent public opinion surveys – which often stress 
Europe’s hostile attitude towards migrants and refugees3 and the need for tougher 
border security in response to unauthorized migration into the EU (see discussion 
below) – very little is known about how resident citizens in Europe understand, 
experience, and talk about the twinned issues of migration and border security in the 
                                                        
1 See, for example, Heaven Crawley et al, ‘Interventions: Europe’s political futures’, Political Geography, 60, 
(2017) pp. 261-271; Ivan Krastev, After Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017); and 
Richard Youngs, New Directions for the European Union: Europe Reset, (London and New York: IB Tauris, 
2017).  
2 See, for example, Heaven Crawley, ‘Managing the unmanageable? Understanding Europe’s response to the 
migration “crisis”, Human Geography, 9:2 (2016), pp.13-23; Heaven Crawley et al, Unravelling Europe’s 
‘Migration Crisis’, (Bristol: Policy Press, 2017), Michael Collyer and Russell King, ‘Narrating Europe’s migration 
and refugee “crisis”’, Human Geography, 9:2 (2016), pp.1-12, Nicholas De Genova, ‘The “migrant crisis” as 
racial crisis: do Black Lives Matter in Europe?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies (2017). 
3 Throughout this article we use ‘migrants and refugees’ pragmatically as a category to refer to those people who 
are on the move and seeking entry to the EU without prior authorization. Where possible we work with the 
categories used in the sources that we analyse and the vernacular usage of these terms was an object of our 
research during the group interviews. A fuller discussion of this issue and our findings is beyond the scope of this 
particular article and will be published in subsequent outputs from the ‘Border Narratives’ project. 
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context of their everyday lives. This lacuna is problematic not only as a deficit of 
knowledge in and of itself, but also because, to paraphrase the seminal work of Jutta 
Weldes et al, if social and cultural meanings of migration and border security are 
constructed inter-subjectively and contested politically, then the grounded perceptions 
and experiences of 'regular' citizens – as well as elites and 'irregular' populations – are 
significant in shaping fields of knowledge, policy, and practice in which responses to 
the ‘crisis’ are made possible.4  
Located within critical security studies (CSS)5 and advancing an emerging 
research agenda that analyses international security in the ‘vernacular’ (see discussion 
below),6 the primary aim of this article is to address the aforementioned knowledge 
deficit by exploring everyday constructions of the so-called ‘migration crisis’ from 
the grounded perspectives of EU citizens. It draws upon the original findings of a 
qualitative research programme incorporating 24 in-depth focus groups held between 
September 2016 and December 2017 with 179 citizens across 11 cities and 5 EU 
Member States differentially affected by recent population displacements in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The ‘Border Narratives’7 project was 
designed to investigate how diverse publics narrate their understandings and 
experiences of the ‘crisis’, the concepts, categories, and identity claims that they use 
in their daily lives, and the extent to which they are aware of and agree with dominant 
policy and media representations of the key issues at stake.  
                                                        
4 Jutta Weldes et al., ‘Introduction: Constructing insecurity’, in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh 
Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (eds) Cultures of Insecurity (Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998). 
5 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 
1997), pp.xii. 
6 Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, ‘Vernacular securities and their study: a qualitative analysis and research agenda’, 
International Relations, 27:2 (2013), pp.158-179. 
7 ‘Everyday Narratives of European Border Security and Insecurity’, project website available at: 
{https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/bordernarratives} accessed 13 April 2018.  
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In keeping with extant qualitative work in vernacular security studies that 
draws inductively on interpretive focus group methodologies, the purpose of our 
fieldwork was not to test particular hypotheses or generate representative or replicable 
data in order to generalise what particular ‘types’ of citizens in different cities and 
countries think and why. Rather, thick descriptive work seeks to generate in-depth 
insights into shared ways of making sense of an issue and ‘the range of possible views 
associated with a particular subject’ at specific geographical sites and moments in 
time.8 On this basis, the aim is to map otherwise subjugated forms of knowledge and 
moments of contestation as well as conformity to elite identity scripts; this is 
significant unless academic research is to risk reproducing elitist echo chambers.  
In addition to broadening the range of issues analysed by vernacular security 
scholars to focus on migration and border security in the contemporary EU context, 
this article seeks to make three principal contributions – theoretical, methodological, 
and empirical – to the securitization of migration and borders specifically and to CSS 
more generally.  
Theoretically, we identify and explore the politics of knowledge production 
and consumption in the representation of public attitudes towards migration and its 
use as a ground to justify border security policy. We focus on the relationship 
between the flagship 2016 EU Global Strategy and its reliance upon the findings of 
the Standard Eurobarometer 84 to legitimize tougher deterrent border controls. 
Drawing on work in CSS that problematizes research methods as performative acts, 
we argue that a circular logic exists whereby an already securitizing mode of 
knowledge production actively shapes representations of public opinion that are then 
used in support of further forms of securitization. Importantly, we do not argue that 
                                                        
8Michael Skey, ‘“A sense of where you belong in the world”: National belonging, ontological security, and the 
status of the ethnic majority in England’, Nations and Nationalism, 16:4 (2010), pp.715-733.  
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this circularity is characteristic of all large-N survey work on the topic of public 
opinion on migration and border security, but rather that greater attention needs to be 
paid to the ways in which some high-profile representations of public opinion 
performatively produce what they purport merely to capture, namely political cultures 
of hostility to the migrant ‘Other’.  
Methodologically, in response to these concerns the article outlines and 
employs an alternative approach, which uses critical focus group research in order to 
guard against the presumption and effects of a securitized framework for fieldwork 
and analysis. In paying careful attention to the framing of group discussion guides and 
asking open-ended questions, we consider the possibility of developing a more self-
reflexive and desecuritizing ethos for research on this topic. Empirically, we argue 
that such an ethos means that the findings of the ‘Border Narratives’ project question 
some of the conclusions of prominent opinion polls as referenced in the context of EU 
policy discussions of contemporary border security. Beyond bifurcated 
understandings of public opinion towards migration into Europe and support for 
either ‘closed’ or ‘open’ borders, the analysis identifies a vernacular theory of ‘the 
border’ as information management; this is a new insight for border studies and 
critical security studies, which demonstrates the value of everyday knowledge as a 
prompt for theoretical development in these fields. We also highlight the prevalence 
of claims about an information gap common among participants with otherwise 
opposing views towards migration and draw out the implications for non-academic 
stakeholders. With the citizens we spoke to across Europe criticizing a lack of 
authoritative and un-biased information on migration and border security, the findings 
challenge the widespread refrain that ours is an age defined by a disdain for experts 
and expertise. Instead, our groups urge creative coalitions between citizens, migrant 
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and refugee communities, and researchers to inform and advise policy-makers in 
responding to the ‘migration crisis’.  
Vernacular security studies and the everyday politics of migration and borders 
Our theoretical starting point is the by-now well-established argument in CSS, as 
paradigmatically outlined by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, that meanings 
and understandings of security and insecurity derive from worldviews that are socially 
constructed and culturally mediated.9 Recent work in the securitization of migration 
literature has applied this derivative approach albeit in different ways and with 
varying emphases in order to explore conceptions and experiences of security and 
insecurity from the diverse perspectives of mobile populations in the European 
context and beyond.10  Much of this scholarship has urged this move towards an 
analysis of the grounded perspectives of populations produced as ‘irregular’ by 
diverse technologies of border control precisely as a corrective to a more elitist focus 
on the securitization of migration via the speech acts of prominent politicians and/or 
the bureaucratic management of issues via securitizing practices.11 For many scholars 
such a move is not only methodological but also political in that it posits an 
alternative ontology that prioritizes migrants’ and refugees’ capacities for political 
                                                        
9 Keith Krause and Michael. C. Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL 
Press, 1997). 
10 Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), Heather Johnson, ‘The 
other side of the fence: Reconceptualizing the “camp” and migration zones at the borders of spain’, International 
Political Sociology, 7:1 (2013), pp. 75-91, Anne McNevin, ‘Beyond territoriality: rethinking human mobility, 
border security and geopolitical space from the Indonesian island of Bintan’, Security Dialogue, 45:3 (2014), pp. 
295 – 310, Vicki Squire (ed) The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2011) 
11 See for example Louise Amoore, ‘Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror’, Political 
Geography, 25 (2006) pp. 336-51, Jef Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the securitization of migration’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), pp. 751-777, Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, 
Migration, and Asylum in the EU (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), William Walters, ‘Mapping 
Schengenland: Denaturalising the border’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 20(5) (2002), pp.564-
80. 
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agency in the form of contestation of, escape from, and/or resistance to governmental 
border technologies.12  
The premise of this article is that while these advances in the securitization of 
migration literature have been very significant in terms of challenging an elitist focus 
and bringing the political subject of the migrant/refugee back in, a further conceptual 
move is necessary in order to understand the field of relations in which meanings of 
migration and border control are socially constructed à la Weldes et al: one that 
incorporates the views and experiences of populations produced as ‘regular’ citizens. 
Indeed, to exclude citizens from a critical analysis of the social construction of 
Europe’s so-called ‘migration crisis’ not only bypasses the vexed issue of the role of 
the audience in legitimizing elite policy responses to that ‘crisis’. It also, to 
paraphrase the recent work of Jef Huysmans, perpetuates exceptionalist readings of 
border (in)security as an exclusive political domain distinct from the realm of ‘the 
everyday’ and overlooks the constitutive political importance of non-elite views, 
knowledge, and experience in the field of migration management.13 In this way, we 
do not see the move to bring the citizen back in as supplanting that of the migrant and 
refugee; rather in our view the former is complementary to the latter in the broader 
effort to decentre and displace an elitist starting point. Equally, it is important to note 
that such decentring and displacement does not mean abandoning analysis of elite 
                                                        
12 See for example Peter Nyers, Rethinking refugees: Beyond state of emergency. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2013); Dimitrios Papadopoulos, et al., Escape routes: control and subversion in the 21st century 
(London: Pluto Press, 2008); Stephan Scheel, ‘Autonomy of migration despite its securitization? Facing the Terms 
and Conditions of Biometric Bordering’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 41(3) (2013), pp.575-600; 
Maurice Stierl, ‘”No one is illegal!” Resistance and the politics of discomfort’, Globalizations, 9(3) (2012): 425-
438. 
13 Jef Huysmans, ‘Conclusion: Insecurity and the everyday’, in Patricia Noxolo and Jef Huysmans 
 (eds.) Community, Citizenship and the ‘War on Terror’: Security and Insecurity, (Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 196–208. 
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policy discourse either, but rather entails its situation alongside and juxtaposition with 
everyday security speak among non-elite citizens.14  
In seeking to recover citizens’ political agency and the constitutive role of 
their expressions of security and insecurity, our study is aligned with and finds 
inspiration from a range of literature associated with ‘vernacular’, ‘everyday’, and 
‘ontological’ studies of security and insecurity. Over the past decade there has been a 
veritable explosion of interest in these and related themes and a comprehensive 
survey of this by-now extensive literature is beyond the scope of this article. Here we 
outline five key strands of work that at once we find inspiration from and seek to 
contribute to. Despite sharing several areas of commonality, these strands are rarely 
brought into conversation with each other. In synthesizing them we hope to stimulate 
new connections as well as emplacing the ‘Border Narratives’ project in a broad 
intellectual context.  
Much of the recent literature that seeks to recover the active and experiencing 
political subject of threat and (in)security has a common root in earlier feminist and 
gender approaches to the everyday.15 In this context Dorothy E. Smith’s classic text, 
The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (1987), established the 
realm of ‘the everyday’ as an important object of sociological enquiry. Smith’s 
explicit focus was to understand the everyday as a key site in the reproduction of 
patriarchal social relations, but also to explore Sociology’s role in supporting that 
reproduction by systematically excluding that site from what was then considered to 
be ‘proper’ to scholarly enquiry. More generally Smith’s insights about the everyday 
– that it is continually brought into being through inter-subjective interaction and 
                                                        
14 Daniel Stevens and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Everyday Security Threats: Perceptions, Experiences, 
Consequences, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016). 
15 Dorothy E. Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1987). 
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meaning-making, that the local and personal is inextricably part of broader social and 
economic organization and thus political, and that it is experienced differently by 
different subjects and an inherently unstable ground and should be treated as a 
research problematic – have resonance beyond feminist Sociology. Her argument that 
the task of the researcher is to bridge the micro-level insights of the experiencing 
subject with macro-level structures of which they are a part and may reproduce can be 
detected in much of the literature interested in personal accounts of (in)security not 
only among migrant and refugee communities, but also citizens.  
In this vein, Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchingson argue that what 
connects recent interdisciplinary studies of ‘everyday security’ is a focus not on 
philosophical meanings of security, but rather ‘how practices of security governance 
are experienced by different people and groups “on the ground” […] and how they are 
implicated in, forged through and find expression via quotidian aspects of social 
life’.16 Thus, departing from elite securitization approaches that are abstracted from 
the context in which security practices take place, the everyday turn in security 
studies has considered inter alia micro-level experiences of surveillance,17 citizenship 
and neighbourliness in the context of counter-terrorism measures, 18  the role of 
popular culture in (re)producing security imaginaries,19 and diverse acts of disruption, 
resistance, and/or desecuritization among citizens. 20  Such work has typically 
employed multi-sited ethnographic methods in order to access and observe rhythms 
                                                        
16 Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchingson, ‘Mapping the contours of “everyday security”: time, space, and 
emotion’, British Journal of Criminology, 56(6) (2016). 
17 Didier Bigo, ‘Security, exception, ban and surveillance’, in David Lyon, (ed.) Theorizing Surveillance: The 
Panopticon and Beyond, (Portland: Willan Publishers, 2006), pp.46-68. 
18 Patricia Noxolo and Jef Huysmans (eds.) Community, citizenship, and the ‘war on terror’: security and 
insecurity, (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
19 Jutta Weldes and Christina Rowley, 'The Evolution of International Security Studies and the Everyday: 
Suggestions from the Buffyverse', Security Dialogue, 43(6) (2012), pp. 513-530. 
20 John Gillom, ‘Resisting surveillance’, Social Text, 23(2) (2005), Peter Nyers, ‘Liberating irregularity: no 
borders, temporality, citizenship’, in Xavier Guillaume and Jef Huysmans (eds.), Citizenship and Security: the 
Constitution of Political Being, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.37-52). 
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and routines that are central to the politics of security and yet otherwise invisible in 
view of a dominant elite focus.  
A third strand of related research has sought to investigate vernacular 
discourses of everyday security from the multiple perspectives of diverse publics. Nils 
Bubandt outlines vernacular security studies as a ‘bottom-up, actor-oriented and 
comparative analysis of the political creation of security’ on the basis that ‘security is 
conceptualized and politics practiced differently in different places and at different 
times’.21 Bubandt’s original formulation has given rise to a now burgeoning research 
agenda in vernacular security studies encompassing an eclectic mix of emancipatory, 
cosmopolitan, and critical-constructivist perspectives. 22  This agenda, codified and 
further expanded upon most notably by Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, has sought to 
document and map the range of referent objects, identity claims, threat cartographies, 
and security imaginaries used in vernacular speak via focus group work.23 Initially 
focused on the politics of citizenship and counter-terrorism, the work of Daniel 
Stevens and Nick Vaughan-Williams has broadened this empirical scope to consider 
everyday perceptions and experiences of a range of issues construed as security 
threats and the role of the citizen in resilience and the risk management cycle.24  
The fourth strand concerns recent interdisciplinary efforts to explore everyday 
cultures of ontological (in)security in the context of anxieties among, for example, 
                                                        
21 Nils Bubandt, ‘Vernacular security: The politics of feeling safe in global, national and local worlds,’ Security 
Dialogue 36(3) (2005), pp. 291. 
22 Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, Anti-terrorism, citizenship and security. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2015), Marie Gillespie, and Ben O' Loughlin, ‘Precarious citizenship: multiculturalism, media and social 
insecurity,’ in Patricia Noxolo and Jef Huysmans (eds.) Community, Citizenship and the ‘War on Terror’: Security 
and Insecurity, (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 89-112, Giles Moss, and Ben O’ 
Loughlin, ‘Convincing claims: Representation and democracy in post-9/11 Britain,’ Political Studies 56:3 (2008), 
pp. 705-24. 
23 On the use of focus groups in the study of security narratives and International Relations more generally see also 
Richard Jackson and Gareth Hall, ‘Talking about terrorism: A study of vernacular discourse’, Politics, 36(3), pp. 
292-307; and Liam Stanley, ‘Using focus groups in political science and International Relations’, Politics, 36(3), 
pp. 236-249. 
24 Daniel Stevens and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Everyday Security Threats: Perceptions, Experiences, 
Consequences (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016). 
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refugee populations,25 children’s geographies of risk and security,26 and the impacts 
of globalization on national and personal identities.27 Working with R. D. Laing’s 
original conceptualization of the ontologically secure individual as being able to ‘take 
the realness, aliveness, autonomy, and identity of himself and others for granted’ and 
the ontologically insecure person as ‘precariously differentiated from the rest of the 
world, so that his identity and autonomy are always in question’,28  this strand is 
pithily summarized by Chris Philo as examining the relationship between ‘“big S’ 
security issues’ and ‘the closest-in human geography of security’.29 
Finally, the fifth strand focuses more specifically on everyday border politics. 
This body of work, pioneered by the late Chris Rumford, has moved critical border 
studies away from a top-down statist view of the border to an understanding of the 
range of actors and encounters that (re)produce borders in daily life. For Rumford, EU 
citizens’ role in performing ‘borderwork’ has been overlooked – a term that he 
employs to refer to the ‘envisioning, constructing, maintaining, and erasing [of] 
borders’.30 Recently, scholars have built on these foundations in order to trace the role 
of the vernacularization of borders in creating politics of fear, 31  in reproducing 
                                                        
25 Louise Waite, Gill Valentine, and Hannah Lewis, ‘Multiple vulnerable populations: mobilizing a politics of 
compassion from “the capacity to hurt”’, Social and Cultural Geography, 15(3) (2014), pp.313-331. 
26 Kate Botterill, Peter Hopkins and Gurchathen Singh Sanghera, ‘Young people’s everyday securities: preemptive 
and proactive strategies towards ontological security in Scotland’, Social and Cultural Geography (2017). 
27 Catarina Kinnvall, ‘Globalization and religious nationalism: Self, identity, and the search for ontological 
security’, Political Psychology, 25(5) (2004), pp.741-767. 
28 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness, (London: Penguin, 2010) [1960], 
p.42. 
29 Chris Philo, ‘Insecure bodies/selves: introduction to theme section’, Social and Cultural Geography, 15(3) 
(2014), pp. 284-90. 
30 Chris Rumford, ‘Introduction: Citizens and Borderwork in Europe’, Space and Polity, 12:1 (2008), p.2. 
31 Anthony Cooper, Chris Perkins, and Chris Rumford, ‘The vernacularisation of borders’, in Reece Jones and 
Corey Johnson (eds.) Placing the Border in Everyday Life (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 15-32. 
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gendered and racialized practices of belonging and segregation,32 and in continuously 
enacting notions of ‘identity, nationality, statehood, and personhood’.33 
In drawing together these five strands our aim is to mobilize the collective 
insights in order to advance vernacular understandings of the everyday politics of 
migration and border control in Europe today and to contribute to each strand in 
mutually complementary ways. Conceptually, this endeavour can be summarized as a 
response to the recent call by Dorte Jagetic Andersen for scholars of border security 
to pay greater attention to the cumulative effect of public opinion in shaping policy 
responses and debates: ‘There is a need to tell stories from the ground […] and to 
emphasise the ability people have to participate in the making of borders as well as 
the regulations and empowerment that can result from border activities’.34 Before we 
present some of the key ‘stories from the ground’ yielded by the ‘Border Narratives’ 
project it is first necessary to contextualize these findings and so the following section 
highlights how public opinion has been represented by the EU Commission and put to 
work in supporting high-profile border security projects in the context of Europe’s 
‘migration crisis’.  
 
The securitization of public opinion in the context of the ‘migration crisis’ 
While the management of unauthorized migration in the Mediterranean region has a 
long history, the EU Commission’s policy response to unprecedented numbers of 
migrants and refugees seeking entry to the EU in 2015 has been characterized by a 
                                                        
32 Nira Yuval-Davies, Georgie Wemyss, and Kathryn Cassidy, ‘Introduction to the special issue: Racialised 
bordering discourses on European Roma’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40:7 (2017), pp.1047-1057; see also Victoria 
Basham and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Gender, race, and border security practices: A profane reading of ‘muscular 
liberalism’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15:4 (2013), pp. 509-527. 
33 Dorte Jagetic Andersen, ‘The multiple politics of borders: Images of the Slovenian-Croation border on Istria 
from the perspective of an ethnographer on the move’, in Dorte Jagetic Andersen, Martin Klatt, and Marie 
Sandberg (eds.) The Border Multiple: The Practicing of Borders between Public Policy and Everyday Life in a 
Rescaling Europe, (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), pp.141-162. 
34 Ibid, p.142. 
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commitment to tougher deterrent border security. The key policy framework for 
handling the so-called ‘migration crisis’ – the ‘European Agenda on Migration’ – has 
focused upon disrupting the business model of smugglers and introduced emergency 
legislation to help Member States ‘confronted with a sudden influx of migrants’ under 
Article 78(3) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. These 
developments, together with the establishment of a new European Border and 
Coastguard Agency with three times as much funding as its predecessor FRONTEX, 
the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) in response to 
exceptional migratory pressures, and the effective militarization of the Mediterranean 
with Operations Triton and Sophia, have amounted to what some commentators see as 
a return to ‘fortress Europe’.35 Furthermore, with the exception in August 2015 of 
Germany’s temporary suspension of the Dublin Regulation for Syrian refugees, the 
response of EU Member States has similarly prioritized heightened border controls. In 
Austria, Hungary, and Slovenia this has meant the erection of physical fences and 
border walls while for other Member States, including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Norway, and Sweden, it has involved the reintroduction of checks on movement 
within the supposedly borderless Schengen zone. 
 Leaving aside the question of whether these tougher border security measures 
merely responded to or helped to produce Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ (or both), the 
key point that we wish to highlight is that these measures have been justified and 
legitimized by the EU Commission with reference to negative – indeed hostile – 
public opinion towards migrants and refugees throughout the EU. In September 2016, 
for example, the EU Commission published a communication entitled ‘Enhancing 
security in a world of mobility’.36 This document argued for the need to strike the 
                                                        
35 Krastev, After Europe; Youngs, Europe Reset. 
36 EU Commission (2016a) 
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right balance between ‘mobility and security concerns’ and referred to a ‘powerful 
consensus’ among EU institutions and citizens about the need for tougher external 
border security in order to ‘reduce the risk of the exceptional pressures’ witnessed 
over the preceding year.37  Under the heading ‘Back to Schengen’, it is stated that the 
strength of the external border is an essential precondition for the freedom of 
movement within the Schengen zone and that greater efforts need to be paid in respect 
of controlling ‘irregular’ arrivals: ‘gaps in border control bring gaps in security’.38 
Elsewhere, in its new flagship ‘Global Strategy’ setting out the vision for the future of 
external security launched three months earlier in June 2016, the Commission 
highlighted that negative popular attitudes towards migration could undermine the 
EU’s strategic objectives and negatively impact European policies: ‘Populism and 
racism could feed fortress Europe mentalities, undermining credible enlargement and 
neighbourhood policies, forthcoming migration and mobility policies, and even trade 
liberalisation’.39  
 Despite this representation of public opinion as hostile towards migrants and 
refugees as a ground for justifying tougher border security, very little research exists 
on EU citizens’ perceptions and experiences of Europe’s ‘migration crisis’.40 If we 
look at the evidence base drawn upon by the EU Commission to support its portrayal 
of public opinion in these key policy statements we see that in fact only one source is 
used repeatedly for this purpose; the findings of the Standard Eurobarometer 84 
survey. If we look more closely it becomes apparent that there is one particular 
                                                        
37 Ibid., p. 2 
38 Ibid., p. 4. 
39 EU Commission (2016b) ‘Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe – Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, p. 28, available at: 
{https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union} accessed 22 
January 2017. 
40 For a summary of extant research and a fuller exploration of the problem to which we refer see Helen Dempster 
and Karen Hargrave, ‘Understanding public attitudes towards refugees and migrants’, Chatham House Working 
Paper 512 (June 2017). 
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finding from that survey that is used to reach this conclusion; that during the height of 
unauthorized arrivals to the EU in autumn 2015 twenty-five Member States were 
reported as having majority negative attitudes towards immigration and that 90% of 
all respondents said that tougher EU border controls were required.41 More closely 
still, we discover that the specific question to which 90% of respondents answered in 
the affirmative was phrased as follows: ‘In your opinion, should additional measures 
be taken to fight illegal migration of people from outside the EU?’ (emphasis 
added).42 
What we see here is an economy of knowledge production and consumption in 
which the EU Commission has taken a particular representation of public opinion 
towards migration into the EU as the authoritative ground on which it then justifies 
tougher border security measures. Yet there are reasons to be sceptical about the 
extent to which that ground can indeed be considered authoritative given that the 
framing of the question on migration in the Eurobarometer 84 survey and subsequent 
surveys is one that already presupposes and reproduces a particular securitized view 
on the issues at stake. Specifically, the use of the words ‘fight’ and ‘illegal’ are not 
neutral value-free terms, but conjure a version of social reality whereby the EU is 
presented as being besieged by outsiders who have no legal basis for seeking entry. In 
this way the chosen methodology establishes a direct link between the social 
construction of migration as threatening and the political practice of deterrent border 
                                                        
41 Eurobarometer 84 (2015), available at: 
{http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDAR
D/surveyKy/2098} accessed 13 July 2017. 
42 Standard Eurobarometer surveys contain questions on general, personal attitudes toward migration, both from 
within the EU and from outside the EU, and allow for responses ranging from ‘total negative’ to ‘total positive’ in 
the context of the respondent’s own member state and the EU as a whole. When asked about a specific policy 
response toward migration this is the only question offered to citizens in Eurobarometer 84. For a critical 
commentary on the politics of Eurobarometer surveys more generally see John Law, ‘Seeing like a survey’, 
Cultural Sociology, 3:2 (2009): pp. 239-256.  
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security measures as advocated by some European institutions.43 This is problematic 
intellectually in the sense that this particular survey design, relying as it does on 
leading questions, constitutes poor social science on its own terms. More 
fundamentally, the EU Commission’s interpretation and use of the ‘results’ are 
problematic politically because they sanction border policies that are not independent 
from the record numbers of migrant and refugee deaths in the Mediterranean region. 
For this reason, the specific relationship between the findings of these Eurobarometer 
surveys and their appropriation by the EU Commission and other EU institutions 
cannot be dismissed as insignificant.44 While other public opinion survey designs 
might successfully operate with less overtly leading questions, we argue that the 
securitized and tautological logic in the production of knowledge in the formulation 
and legitimization of the EU’s border security policy warrants a critical scholarly 
intervention and greater scrutiny regarding the operation, representation, and 
production of ‘public opinion’ in this context.  
Securitization theory has long established that there is no intrinsic meaning to 
the concept of ‘security’, but that the social construction of an issue as a matter of 
security is performed. 45  Beyond the established focus on elite political rhetoric, 
knowledge, and speech acts, the function of security as a ‘thick signifier’ extends to a 
range of sites of knowledge production throughout society.46 As Claudia Aradau and 
Jef Huysmans have emphasized, careful attention needs to be given to the 
                                                        
43 On the self-referential dynamic and performative effects of methodology, see also John Law and John Urry, 
‘Enacting the social’, Economy and Society, 33:3 (2004): pp. 390–410. 
44 A similar example of an elite association made between hostile representations of public opinion and 
justifications for tougher border security occurred in June 2016. The European Parliament published the results of 
a special Eurobarometer poll, which reported that on the issue of migration 66% of respondents considered EU 
action to be insufficient and that 74% would like to see the EU take more action. This was followed by a reference 
to the protection of external borders where 61% considered EU action to be insufficient and 71% would like to see 
the EU take more action, available at: 
{http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20160623PVL00111/Europeans-in-2016-Perceptions-and-
expectations-fight-against-terrorism-and-radicalisation} accessed 3 January 2018. 
45 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998) 
46 Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What do you mean? From concept to thick signifier,’ European Journal of 
International Relations, 4:2 (1998), pp. 226-255. 
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methodologies through which securitization takes place. For Aradau and Huysmans, 
‘methods need to be understood as performative rather than representational’;47 that is 
to say they create what they purport merely to uncover. While Aradau and Huysmans’ 
ostensible focus is the academic study of security their insights are equally apposite 
for a critical analysis of the knowledge economy described above. Not only does the 
question presented in the Eurobarometer surveys already operate within a securitized 
framework in its usage of the terms ‘fight’ and ‘illegal’; the EU Commission’s 
appropriation of these findings in support of tougher border security measures 
constitutes a tautology that reinforces the conditions for securitization that it claims to 
be responding to. In turn, these dynamics entrench a homogenizing depiction of ‘the 
EU public’ as straightforwardly desiring greater border control, which feeds hostile 
portrayals of migrant and refugee communities in dominant media and policy 
discourses. Finally, irrespective of the issue of intentionality (of EU Commissioners, 
of the designers of the Eurobarometer surveys, of respondents to it), the cumulative 
effects of the securitization of public opinion in this way has serious implications for 
migrants and refugees seeking entry to Europe. 
 This commentary on the findings of the Eurobarometer 84 and their 
appropriation by the EU Commission is not merely to state the obvious – that any 
form of quantitative or indeed qualitative research design and methodology carries 
with it a certain form of bias – but rather to emphasize that the political interpretation 
and analysis of public attitudes towards migration and border control can have 
securitizing effects. Furthermore, we do not wish to be misinterpreted as arguing that 
all public opinion surveys on migration are somehow flawed, misleading, or 
                                                        
47 Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans, ‘Critical methods in International Relations: The politics of techniques, The 
devices and acts,’, European Journal of International Relations, 20:3 (2014): pp. 596–619. Aradau and Huysmans 
refer to methods not as technologies to scientifically represent an observable external reality, but as ‘devices’ to 
enact particular social and political worlds, and ‘acts’, which ‘can also create ruptures in these worlds’, Aradau and 
Huysmans, p. 603. 
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securitizing in their very nature; that is categorically not what we are saying and 
indeed there are examples of recent survey work in Europe that challenge the 
Eurobarometer’s depiction of EU citizens as hostile to migrants and overwhelmingly 
in favour of stronger border control.48  Rather, we suggest, following Aradau and 
Huysmans, that care is required to identify securitizing methodologies and to trace 
their effects when studying this issue. This is not least because, as we will argue in 
our analysis of the findings of the ‘Border Narratives’ project, working within a 
securitized frame renders invisible the varied complexities and nuances of vernacular 
perceptions and experiences that might be taken by policy-making communities as 
actually-existing grounds for alternative responses.  
 
Critical focus group research: towards a desecuritizing ethos  
Our aim in the research design of the ‘Border Narratives’ project was purposefully to 
avoid the kind of securitizing logic implicit in the closed and leading questions that 
we have considered in the case of the Standard Eurobarometer 84 survey. Anna 
Leander argues that processes of desecuritization necessarily involve ‘contesting 
securitizing experience so as to reconceptualize issues and problems as not being 
about security’ precisely in order to then ‘repoliticise them’. 49  In pursuit of a 
desecuritizing ethos, and building upon recent work in vernacular security studies 
reviewed above, we developed a qualitative programme of critical focus group 
research (FGR); this methodology allowed us to facilitate open discussions among 
participants in order to find out what vocabularies and cultural frameworks are 
operating that pertain to migration into the EU and border control.  
                                                        
48 See for example the highly nuanced findings of the survey ‘Attitudes towards national identity, immigration, and 
refugees in Germany’, PURPOSE (July 2017). 
49 Anna Leander, ‘Marketing security matters: Undermining de-securitization through acts of citizenship’, in 
Patricia Noxolo and Jef Huysmans (eds.) Community, citizenship, and the ‘war on terror’: security and insecurity, 
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.108. 
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By now, critical approaches to FGR – going beyond the method’s conceptual 
origins in positivistic social psychology and psychotherapy – have become a well-
established method in vernacular security studies. Critical FGR analysis explores how 
the social construction of meaning functions inter-subjectively, how it is culturally 
embedded, and how it is politically contested.50 Crucially, the aim of discussions of 
this kind is not to produce a consensus based around fixed attitudes, but rather to 
create a reflexive forum for investigating ‘how knowledge, ideas, story-telling, self-
presentation and linguistic exchanges operate within a given cultural context’.51  
Thus, while other qualitative methods such as multi-sited ethnography and/or 
social media content analysis might also be mobilized to study vernacular security, 
critical FGR is arguably unique in that it fosters openness, spontaneity, and reflexivity 
among researchers and participants while at the same time retaining an analytical 
focus on the key issues being investigated. Critical FGR allows for group dynamics to 
emerge that are insightful when trying to understand the limits of what can and cannot 
be said at the micro-level, which following Smith above reveals facets of macro-level 
social and cultural discourse. As such, critical FGR offers a significant 
contextualizing resource, whereby vernacular knowledge, attitudes, and expressions 
can tell us about broader dynamics without foisting securitizing frames or the motives 
of the researcher onto the discussion.  
It must be stressed that in adopting a critical FGR approach we do not deny 
the salience or relevance of quantitative surveys of public opinion. The former, unlike 
the latter, cannot claim replicability or generalizability and is not representative due to 
                                                        
50 Tracey Coule, ‘Theories of Knowledge and Focus Groups in Organization and Management Research’, 
Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal, 8:2 (2013), pp. 148-162; 
Rosaline Barbour and Jenny Kitzinger (eds.) Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and Practice 
(London and New Delhi: Sage, 2009); Katrina Rodriguez et al, ‘Culturally Responsive Focus Groups: Reframing 
the Research Experience to Focus on Participants’, International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 10:4 (2011), pp. 
401-417. 
51 Barbour and Kitzinger (2009), p. 5. 
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small sample sizes. Nevertheless, the former can allow for the emergence of a wider 
bandwidth of opinion and deeper understanding of why people hold the views that 
they do. In other words, whereas surveys may tell us that European citizens want 
more or less border security in response to migration into Europe, a critical FGR 
methodology can help us to better understand how citizens use and understand the 
concepts of ‘border’ and ‘border security’ in the context of their daily lives. As a 
participatory research methodology, critical FGR also moves beyond a treatment of 
the citizen-participant as a passive political agent. In contributing to group discussions 
citizens exercise political agency, which aligns with Aradau’s and Huysman’s 
definition of method as act; 52  it also means, following Stevens and Vaughan-
Williams’ approach drawing upon Jacques Rancière, that ‘vernacular constructions, 
experiences and stories of (in)security have the potential to disrupt ‘official’ accounts 
and repoliticize the technocratic foundations of national security policies.’53 
 In total, the ‘Border Narratives’ project involved 24 focus groups with 179 
participants (86 female, 93 male, and varied for age and occupational status for the 
purpose of diversity). Groups were organized in 11 cities across 5 EU Member States 
differentially affected by the so-called ‘migration crisis’ (Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Spain, and the UK). Fieldwork took place in three phases held approximately 12 and 
24 months on from the peak of unauthorized arrivals to the EU in November 2015: 
phase 1 (November-December 2016) included 8 groups in Miskolc, Munich, 
Nottingham, and Miskolc; phase 2 (September-October 2017) consisted of 12 groups 
in Berlin, Budapest, Cologne Coventry, and London; and phase 3 (November 2017) 
involved 4 further groups in Barcelona and Cadiz. Geographically, the project sought 
the widest possible span in the light of resource constraints, seeking to combine the 
                                                        
52 Ibid., p. 608. 
53 Dan Stevens and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Vernacular theories of everyday (in)security: The disruptive 
potential of non-elite knowledge,’ Security Dialogue, 47:1 (2016): pp. 40-58, p. 42. 
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experiences of citizens resident in: ‘frontline’ arrival states (Greece, Spain); a transit 
state on the central Balkan route (Hungary); a major destination state (Germany); and 
a peripheral state with few resettlements (UK).  
In conducting the fieldwork, we worked closely with a social research 
company and a team of local professional qualitative researchers in each city who 
recruited participants, organized venues and interview sessions, conducted interviews 
in local languages, and recorded, transcribed, and translated the interview material for 
analysis using FGR methods above. Focus group discussions were held in a mixture 
of venues, including hotels and research facilities, and each session lasted between 90 
and 120 minutes with different moderators working with the same discussion guide at 
each location. We led or actively took part – either individually or together – in 6 of 
the meetings and observed 2 further meetings remotely via video-link. We co-
authored the multi-lingual discussion guide – in close consultation with the team of 
moderators who fed-back as ‘critical friends’ at each stage in its development – in 
order to ensure consistency of approach and questioning across all groups. The guide 
was subject to a rigorous independent ethical review and each stage of the fieldwork 
was governed by the principles of data confidentiality and informed consent. 
 Prior to group discussions taking place, each participant was asked to respond 
to a screening question: ‘On the subject of migration, from 1 to 10 how strongly do 
you feel that people in Europe have a responsibility to help migrants with 10 being the 
strongest and 1 being the weakest?’ Responses to this question were then used in 
order to organize two groups – divided broadly into ‘pro-migration’ (6-10) and ‘anti-
migration’ (1-5), respectively – in each city. This distinction was introduced in order 
to create group dynamics that would facilitate open and free-flowing discussion 
among respondents on the basis of existing focus group research that suggests 
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individuals are more likely to speak freely about sensitive or controversial topics 
among like-minded participants.54  
Discussions began by exploring the vernacular categories and concepts used to 
describe migration and border security in general. Thus, instead of presupposing the 
meaning of key terms or asking closed, leading questions, we began with open-ended 
discussion prompts, such as ‘When I say the word “migration” what words, images, 
and feelings come to mind?’ and “Some people feel that migration is a threat, others 
see it as an opportunity – what kind of threats and opportunities are associated with 
migration for you?’. From this general introduction into the topic, the discussion 
guide moved to address understandings and perceptions of migration into Europe 
since 2015 and the personal impact, if any, that respondents had experienced in the 
context of their everyday lives. We were especially interested to investigate 
awareness of and agreement with mainstream political and media framings of the 
migration ‘crisis’ in each country by posing questions such as ‘Over the last 18 
months migration into Europe has become an issue that has dominated the news and 
speeches made by politicians – how do you feel about this issue and the way it has 
been discussed in the news?’ and ‘Thinking about your own daily life, how does 
migration into your country affect you and your family?’. In the final segment, the 
discussion guide addressed the issue of border security and policy responses to 
migration into Europe, asking citizens about their perceptions of border security in 
their country/the EU: ‘When I say ‘border’ and ‘border security’ what words, images, 
and feelings come to mind?’; ‘Do you feel that your country/the EU has control over 
                                                        
54 Dan Stevens, and Nick Vaughan-Williams, 'Citizens and Security Threats: Issues, Perceptions, and 
Consequences Beyond the National Frame', British Journal of Political Science, 46:1 (2016), pp. 149-175, Dan 
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its borders?’; ‘What is the one thing that you would ask politicians and policy-makers 
to do in response to migration and border security?’.  
 Having produced an archive of 300,000 words of transcript material based on 
more than 2,200 minutes of discussion time it is not possible within the parameters of 
this article to do justice to the breadth, depth, and richness of the thematic content of 
the interviews. Neither is it possible here to tease out many of the nuanced responses 
we elicited based on geopolitical contexts and/or different points in time. Rather, we 
limit the remainder of this discussion to focus upon some of our key findings in 
respect of the last segment of the group interviews concentrating on vernacular 
imaginaries of the border and border security. As such, we seek to present some of the 
main recurring themes across groups and concentrate on what they have in common 
more so than what divides them and to juxtapose these findings with those elite 
representations of public opinion discussed earlier. On the basis of a qualitative 
content analysis which coded the transcripts in line with a critical FGR strategy 
discussed above we emphasize two key areas for critical elaboration: 1) how groups 
conceptualize borders and what they understand by ‘border security’ and 2) their 
association of ‘weak’ border security with a pervasive ‘information gap’. 
 
Vernacular conceptualizations of ‘border security’ as information management 
As we have seen, tougher deterrent border security has been posited as the primary 
policy framework in which both the EU Commission and national governments have 
responded to the so-called ‘migration crisis’. But how do members of ‘the public’ 
conceptualize borders and border security? Are citizens aware of measures to protect 
the borders of their country and the EU more generally? Do they support these 
measures undertaken and legitimized in their name? 
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 All of our groups – irrespective of their previously stated views about 
migration into Europe – used the concepts of the ‘border’, ‘border security’, and 
‘border control’ freely, but often expressed difficulties in precisely defining these 
terms and used them inter-changeably. While some interviewees made explicit 
associations with ‘guards, fences, and barbed wire’ (Péter and Ádám, Budapest, anti; 
Hanna, Munich, pro) – and others with checks at ports and airports for ‘drugs, guns, 
and weapons’ (Aimee, Nottingham, pro) – the majority of groups did not discuss 
border security in terms of physical barriers and controls.    
Most of the citizens we spoke with did not agree with the basic idea that 
anyone should be allowed to move freely across the borders of states and in general 
there was support for the notion that a state should be permitted to ‘let the right 
people out, and the right people in’ (Gary, Nottingham, pro). Some participants were 
vocal in associating the notion of ‘open borders’ with a ‘lack of control and bad 
consequences’ (Bence, Miskolc, pro). Others were more pragmatic and noted that, 
irrespective of ideals about controls over movement into states, the realities of 
geographical context often mean that these ideals remain as such. In Cadiz, for 
example, one respondent (Aaron, Cadiz, anti) suggested that the Spanish state should 
simply allow ‘free entrance’ via the port and then ‘control over the people who come 
in’, which was seen as impossible by several others in the group who remonstrated 
with him (Cristina, Carlos, and Maria, Cadiz, anti).  
When pushed about the extent to which they thought that states should be 
permitted to use force when attempting to control the movement of people across 
international borders there was an overwhelming urge for restraint. Even in Miskolc, 
where some participants were in favour of the Orbán government’s hardline approach 
to border security and expressed willingness to see ‘guns, truncheons, and pepper 
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spray’ (Bence, Miskolc, pro), there was a general agreement that the principle of 
proportionality should apply. In Nottingham and Munich there was a greater degree of 
reticence about ever using force in order to secure national borders: ‘[…] maybe to 
restrain if they’re going to attack you or something, but not manhandling them for 
nothing, that’s bang out of order’ (Nicky, Nottingham, anti); ‘[…] it’s not allowed for 
Germans to behave that way toward other Germans, so it should also not be allowed 
toward other people. German law is still valid in this context. Self-defense is allowed, 
but nothing beyond that’ (Stefanie, Munich, pro).  
Some participants – particularly those in Munich – expressed an overt 
scepticism about the efficacy of physical border controls as a governmental response 
to the issue of migration. In the following exchange, the effectiveness of German 
border control is questioned, but the explanation offered by another member of the 
group is that it needs to be understood as a performance of security designed to 
simulate the effect of protecting citizens: 
(Hanna, Munich, pro): If you’re traveling on the autobahn and drive over the border, police 
are there and the cars drive slowly through, they shine a flashlight into the car if it’s at night, 
but they never really ask anyone to step out of the car.  So if someone is hiding in the trunk or 
lying somewhere, they don’t really check that. 
 
(Heinz, Munich, pro): They run those patrols to make people feel safer, so that the German 
citizens for instance feel safer. They started doing that to control the borders, but it’s not really 
done with the intention of trying to find anyone, but rather so that the people have the feeling 
that something is being done and they’re protecting us from immigration threats. 
 
In Miskolc a similar line of argumentation was pushed further by one participant who 
argued that the Orbán government had deliberately inflated the threat of ‘irregular’ 
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migration in Hungary in order to respond in a way that sought to shore up its own 
power: 
(Bence, Miskolc, pro): First the politicians are scaring the public then promise them “We do 
everything to protect you” and then we will vote for them. Then they say, look we have 
stopped the migrants. And then it's a very selfish reason for saying what they're saying. 
 
In Cadiz, one member of the pro-migration group suggested that for her adequate 
border control would itself ‘avoid violence and the use of force. That control is 
necessary, and it must come from people governing…’ (Almudena, Cadiz, pro). The 
discussion in which Almudena made that comment was typical of many other group 
exchanges that recognized the legitimacy of the use of force by the police or army to 
protect the border but rejected its use to systematically repel migrants and refugees: 
 
(Rocío, Cadiz, pro): But when we talk about controls, this implies violence too. On the fences 
and conflictive places, there’s violence. And that can’t be avoided. If a person wants to jump 
over, how can the police avoid that person from crossing? This causes a clash, obviously.  
(Antonio Cadiz, pro):  I think that this could be avoided. 
(Daniel, Cadiz, pro): This is caused by the constitution of the state, as it has the monopoly of 
violence, so to speak. It’s the only part that can use the force in this case. I don’t think this is 
right, but it happens.  
(José Manuel, Cadiz, pro): In some cases, I think it is necessary. 
Moderator: In what cases?  
(Rocío, Cadiz, pro): But they are in a very bad situation, and not only with that, they are 
beaten… That’s not fair.  
(Elena, Cadiz, pro): I think it’s not necessary. 
(Andrés, Cadiz, pro): They should create some type of logistics to avoid violence.  
Moderator : In this case, do you think it should be authorised?  
(Andrés, Cadiz, pro): I don’t think so.  
(Almudena Cadiz pro): I don’t think so.  
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(Elena, Cadiz, pro): No way. 
(José Manuel, Cadiz, pro): It’s a vicious circle. I am not in favour of violence, of course. But 
imagine our border with Morocco, we have it very close. There are two police officers, no 
matter if they are good or bad, and hundreds of people and you don’t know what their 
intentions are, if they are going to run away or not when passing the control. So, a control is 
necessary… particularly if there are a lot of people who want to pass.  
(Almudena, Cadiz pro): That’s a real problem.  
(Daniel, Cadiz, pro): In that case, they should send 200 police officers to that post, not only 2.  
(José Manuel, Cadiz, pro): But then we would be talking about another problem.  
(Rocío, Cadiz, pro): That’s the point, the use of measures to avoid that. What happens? When 
the police feel threatened, they take their truncheons and use them.  
(José Manuel, Cadiz, pro): That’s it.  
(Almudena, Cadiz pro): This depends on the measures used by the Spanish government.  
(Daniel, Cadiz, pro): You have to be in a situation like that to know how it is and how you 
will react. When you see an avalanche like that coming to you, and we draw from the premise 
that they don’t have that intention, but we never know what will happen.  
(Almudena, Cadiz pro): It’s necessary to avoid that avalanche. 
 
What is illuminating about this exchange is that it identifies and explores from a 
vernacular perspective the political and ethical dilemmas of border control, the limits 
about what solutions might be considered socially and culturally acceptable in that 
context, and ultimately dismisses both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ options for responding to 
migration into Europe, in this case via the 96 kilometers that separates Cadiz and 
Tangier. Indeed, it is an exchange that reflects well one of the recurring themes 
throughout all of our group discussions, which was that, rather than a straightforward 
endorsement of either ‘border walls’ (‘hard’) or ‘open borders’ (‘soft’), the concept of 
‘border security’ was typically deployed by participants in a much more nuanced and 
thoughtful way. Instead of relying upon such crude bifurcations, the EU citizens we 
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met more commonly talked about border security as a short-hand for a range of 
knowledge production practices concerning the identity of migrants and refugees 
seeking entry into their country and the EU: who they were, what their histories 
entail, why they had chosen to leave their countries of origin, and how they intended 
to spend their time abroad. As such, border security practices conceptualized and 
endorsed by the participants we met were not akin to physical tools that might be used 
to ‘fight’ those portrayed by the Eurobarometer surveys as ‘illegal’ entrants to the EU. 
Instead, the vernacular border imaginary we repeatedly encountered was one reliant 
upon notions of and calls for rigorous data collection and the verification of identities 
and intentions. Members of a range of groups spoke therefore primarily of border 
security as the management of information and crucially the ability of state authorities 
to assert a degree of control over that information management process:  
 
When you have people going in and out of the country […] you should know what their 
circumstances are, up to a certain point, not to be completely invasive and delve into their 
private lives but are they coming for a holiday. Are they coming to work or what’s their 
business (Jez, London, pro).  
 
If we have reliable information about them, because it also matters where they come from, I 
have nothing against people wanting to live here because they like it here, just as our fellow 
citizens go to Germany or Britain  (Tamás, Budapest, pro). 
The registration and what we do with the people who come to our country. And the controls at 
the border should be better. They have to check what kind of refugees they are and where they 
come from (Uta, Berlin, anti). 
 
It shouldn’t be a fence. It should rather be a kind of registration or reception facility where 
somebody gives you a bottle of water, some new clothing and welcomes you! (Charlotte, 
Berlin, pro). 
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Thus, instead of greater investment in tougher physical border security understood as 
the prevention of mobility, groups called for a perspective on border control that does 
not involve ‘micro-chipping everyone’, but ‘keeping an eye on them’ (Nicky, 
Nottingham, anti) and ‘registering them straightaway’ (Stefanie, Munich, pro) in 
order to ‘identify criminals’  (Hanna, Munich, pro).  They also called upon their 
governments to alleviate the need for migrants to seek irregular entry to the EU in the 
first place: 
(Johnny, Nottingham, pro): The influx of migrants heading towards the UK, rather than focus 
on dealing with just the result, shed light on how you could tackle what caused them to come 
over. If you can stop it at the other end, at some point the issue will be sorted. Then you’ll 
have the cause sorted and everyone will be happy. 
 
(Fanni, Miskolc, anti): I think the whole thing shouldn't have been allowed by the world. We 
shouldn't have allowed this to happen. We should have paid more attention to the ethnic 
groups of Africa with special regard to their health and culture and from every aspect. We 
should support them in their development and in avoiding wars.  
 
Reflecting on the group discussions as a whole, then, it is striking that there were no 
calls for tougher border controls, understood as physical measures designed to curb 
the mobility of migrants and refugees. As such, this finding not only provides 
qualitative insight into vernacular conceptualizations of contemporary border security, 
but it also raises questions about the conclusions of the Eurobarometer 84 survey and 
the EU Commission’s catchall portrayal of public opinion as being overwhelmingly in 
support of tougher measures to fight illegal migration. A more open-ended framework 
of questioning working with a desecuritizing ethos therefore appears to produce very 
different grounds on which alternative policy responses might be constructed. 
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‘Weak’ border security as an information gap 
We have seen that vernacular conceptualizations of border security often frame it in 
terms of a state’s ability to manage and control information about movement into and 
within a given territory. Three related themes emerge across our groups stemming 
from this central insight: 1) that ‘weak’ border security is perceived in the absence of 
such information; 2) that even if authorities possess such information it needs to be 
communicated to and accepted by citizens in order to avoid perceptions of 
‘weakness’; and 3) that further insecurities may be generated if the kind of 
information that is in circulation about migration and border security is perceived not 
to be trustworthy. Taken together, we refer to these issues as a widespread 
‘information gap’ identified throughout our fieldwork. 
 A perception among participants in all of the groups was that weak or non-
existent border security was a critical issue facing the whole of the EU, which in 
general was characterized as ‘impotent’ (Hungary, Janos, pro), ‘poorly managed’ 
(UK, Emily, pro), and, echoing arguments made by Brexiteers in the context of the 
UK’s 2016 referendum on EU membership, ‘out of control’ (UK, Paul, pro). The 
corollary of the conceptualization of border security as information management is 
that weak border security was primarily associated with the inability of the state to 
check the identities of populations on the move. There was a general perception in 
Thessaloniki, for example, that Greece had little or no ability to gather and analyse 
data about people on the move: ‘Data identification. In Germany everything is 
chipped. One friend of mine living there told me about how everything is so under 
control. Here we like a jungle. No identification, who is who, believing that by 
holding an ID we have proof about everything’ (Greece, Alexandra, pro). 
 31 
 This perceived lack of information about human mobility – both in terms of a 
belief that national governments did not know who was in their country and their 
inability to communicate basic facts about the ‘migration crisis’ – was one of the most 
consistent narratives we encountered. Such an information gap generated considerable 
insecurities that were expressed about where to obtain accessible, authoritative, and 
reliable knowledge in order to 1) inform individuals’ own views and opinions on 
migration and 2) assess governments’ performance in terms of border security and the 
successful integration of migrants and refugees. Members of pro- and anti-migration 
focus groups expressed a general distrust of governments for manipulating the issue, 
which, in turn, was associated with a breakdown in trust and the cultivation of 
conditions suited to the rise of xenophobia and right-wing populism across the EU: 
  
(Daniel, Cadiz, pro): It’s happening again what happened in 1939. It’s the same story. 
(Rocio, Cadiz, pro): Yes. It is repeating itself.  
(Daniel, Cadiz, pro): The current world is ‘declining’ in general. And eventually they put 
people against each other and we fight. And they are creating a xenophobia feeling about 
people. 
(Antonio, Cadiz, pro): That’s what’s happening in France with Le Pen. They have created a 
discourse and blame immigrants with all the problems they have. And the same with 
Catalonia and their independence. There is a group of politicians who have created a breeding 
ground and many people have believed them.  
(Almudena, Cadiz, pro): Now everyone has access to social networks, and everyone can give 
their opinion, and this increases the problem. 
 
There was a persistent complaint that politicians and governments did not accurately 
represent the views and positions of EU citizens and that they either mismanaged 
migration or sought to capitalize upon it for political gain: “I feel threatened and my 
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world view being a European has been unraveled. But it has less to do with the people 
who come here than with the fact how Europe deals with it (Stefanie, Berlin, pro). 
Similarly, pro and anti groups were all highly critical – albeit sometimes in 
different ways – of the mediation of the ‘crisis’. News agencies were widely 
considered to have sensationalized the crisis and some participants even speculated as 
to whether certain scenes had been deliberately staged in order to achieve maximum 
impact. A lack of nuance was also typically detected with tendencies in the 
mainstream press towards either ‘sugar coating’ or ‘scapegoating’: 
 
I think some stories are just blown out of all proportion, especially in things like the Sun and 
the Mail. For example with asylum seekers give them a flat like or a council flat instead of 
like an English speaking person, they get crazy front page headlines (Paul, London, pro). 
 
 (…) I think the public’s perception, rightfully so, is negative because that’s what we’re fed 
through social media, through the news. Good news doesn’t sell, so they will look for the 
most horrific harrowing stories to get that shock factor (Laura, Coventry, anti).  
 
But I think you only hear the negative examples. I think from all the 100%, there are maybe 
5% that get that negative attention. Those 5% are shown in the news and therefore, everyone 
complains about how bad the refugees are, when most of them really try (Olivia, Cologne, 
pro). 
 
Among pro-migration groups was a particular emphasis on the massified imagery 
associated with mainstream media coverage of ‘irregular’ arrivals at Mediterranean 
entry points and what some considered to be the problematic absence of a 
commitment to featuring individualized narratives and personal stories. Pro-migration 
participants also voiced criticism of media bias in the wake of terrorist incidents in 
Europe and the 2015/2016 New Year’s Eve celebration in Cologne where hundreds of 
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women reported having been sexually assaulted by male perpetrators of ‘Arab or 
North African appearance’:  
 
(Dave, Coventry, pro) I think when you see all these things on the news like the Bataclan 
bombing and then we’ve had bombings in London, and it’s highlighted by the media, and it 
raises public awareness, and people think that’s not what Britain’s about (...). And I think 
people do become more racist when they see things like that, because it’s in their face. If it 
wasn’t in their face as much maybe they wouldn’t. 
 
(Stefanie, Berlin, pro): There was an interesting change. At the beginning, the euphoria was 
great. Well, for me Cologne was most present, especially from my perspective. The feministic 
nihilism was shaped by this. A lot has happened there which also has led to this negative 
image. (…) the media … took quite some effort that a specific image is created, especially 
from male immigrants. 
 
Equally, anti-migration groups called into question the veracity of scenes later on in 
the ‘crisis’ such as the controversial depiction and circulation of images of the lifeless 
body of Alain Kurdi, the 5 year-old Syrian refugee washed up on the shores of a 
Turkish holiday resort. There was a strong sense among pro- and anti-migration 
groups alike that the media was either not telling the whole story, or manipulating 
facts on the ground in a positive or negative direction. As one participant in Cologne 
put it, ‘The media tell you only a part of what actually happened. I have many friends 
at the police and the federal police force therefore I know how many things really 
happened. The media keeps many secrets from us’ (Frank, Cologne, anti). What is 
common to both ‘sides’, therefore, is an absence of trusted and authoritative sources 
of vernacular knowledge. This lacuna then leads to greater scope for rumour, 
speculation, and ultimately inaccurate or misleading information to fill the gaps:  
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(Dennis, Berlin, anti): I think neutrality is missing, they [the media] always give an opinion. 
Or they try that the people feel bad about it. There comes always a connotation with it. They 
should deliver the information in a neutral way, so every person could make his own opinion. 
And people could also discuss in an active way and come to constructive solutions. 
 
(Britta, Cologne, pro): I think they [politicians] are lying. They are only saying what we want 
to hear. A good example was the TV debate [between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
her challenger SPD chairman Martin Schulz in the run-up to the 2017 Federal elections], I 
didn't see it but one journalist said that it was rather a duet than a debate. And in a lot of cases, 
they make a lot of promises prior to an election that are not being kept afterwards. And that is 
fact. 
 
The impact of social media, online communication, and so-called ‘fake news’ was 
also problematized in this context. 
 
(Christian, Berlin, pro): The danger is that through digitalization that it is easy to get in touch 
with information that is not true. I have been in Iran two years ago and I met an academic 
person, well-educated and speaking English fluently. He was convinced that in Germany, 
everyone gets sponsored half of a Mercedes for his 18th birthday. 
 
(Charlotte, Berlin, pro): Many fake news have been used again and again. They never 
corrected it afterwards. 
 
When we asked our participants what they wanted policy-makers to do 
differently in response to the ‘migration crisis’ we found that, as well as calls for EU 
governments to take greater responsibility and to cooperate more fully on the issues, 
citizens want better access to trusted sources of information in order to allow them to 
make their own informed assessments about migration and border security: ‘What I 
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find difficult is to find the truth’ (Daniel, Cologne, pro). We were also confronted by 
challenges to academic researchers to do more to analyse what the needs of migrants 
are, how they can be better supported from an integration perspective, and what they 
need from citizens in order to thrive in common. A qualitative, participatory research 
agenda working with a desecuritizing ethos can contribute to addressing this 
information gap; as one focus group participant in Barcelona noted: ‘I haven’t 
changed my mind, but I have more information’ (Manuela, Barcelona, pro). In the 
final analysis, messages like these challenge dominant representations of ours as an 
age supposedly marked by the rise of populism, the political sway of ‘fake news’, and 
the widespread disdain for experts and expertise.  
 
Conclusion: Actually-existing alternative border imaginaries 
Border security and migration into the EU are topics of daily conversation among EU 
citizens. These topics shape citizens’ perceptions of self-identity and security, and that 
of their communities, nations, and indeed the EU at large. In turn, these perceptions 
inform everyday routines and behaviours such as where people shop, how they spend 
their leisure time, and why they choose certain modes of transport and routes to and 
from work. Yet despite the centrality of these dynamics in shaping the field of 
relations in which issues are framed, policy responses are made, and government and 
media messages are consumed, very little is known about how diverse publics are 
understanding and negotiating these dynamics and how this activity is also shaping 
Europe’s political futures.  
 While prominent opinion polls such as the Standard Eurobarometer 84 imply 
that EU citizens have been overwhelmingly hostile to migrants and refugees and thus 
supportive of tougher border security, our findings paint a more complex and 
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ambivalent picture. Despite our efforts to adopt a non-securitizing ethos in conducting 
group discussions, conversations about migration into the EU were often couched by 
individual participants in the securitized language of threats – to national stability, 
economic well-being, and personal safety. However, there were also a number of 
countervailing narratives, which were often voiced by the same individuals who had 
said that they felt threatened by migrants and refugees in different ways. Alongside an 
association between ‘migration’ and ‘threat’ were reflections about the positive 
effects of migration on societies and economies, the ethical obligations of host 
societies, and expressions of solidarity with those on the move. These counter-
narratives are important because they give rise to an actually-existing alternative 
ground on which policy responses to migration into the EU might be developed.  
Alongside articulations of threats to societal security, a number of participants 
also spoke openly about greater ethnic and cultural diversity as a progressive force in 
their respective geographical contexts. For some interviewees in Miskolc, for 
example, migrants were associated with ‘dancing, creative and visual arts, and food’ 
(Reka, Miskolc, pro), which give rise to a more ‘colourful culture […] different from 
ours’ (Bence, Miskolc, pro). Such diversity, even in groups categorized as ‘anti’, was 
seen by some in Nottingham as ‘a positive thing’ (Jill, Nottingham, anti) because 
‘people are learning about everyone and their different ways of life’ (Stuart, 
Nottingham, anti). These refusals of the straightforward link between migration and 
security also manifested themselves in a range of statements in support of migrant and 
refugee communities and initiatives. Some of these were clustered around the 
reallocation of government spending on deterrent border security measures towards 
more rights-based approaches. One interviewee in Miskolc, for example, commented 
that, instead of building walls and funding the recent referendum campaign, the 
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Hungarian government could have ‘literally helped a lot of people, a lot more’ (Attila, 
Miskolc, pro). Others across the groups expressed support for finding ways of 
assisting undocumented migrants in particular: by improving conditions in the context 
of their journeys to Europe (Heinz, Munich, pro); by creating legal crossings via land 
instead of exposing them to lethal conditions on the Mediterranean (Anton, Munich, 
anti); and helping them to obtain ‘documentation’ that would allow them to work 
legally once in Europe (Johnny, Adam, Nottingham, pro).  
In response to questioning around whether participants feel any sense of 
personal obligation to migrants seeking entry to Europe there were a number of 
participants – particularly in the Miskolc group – who rejected the notion that they 
should do more to assist, as captured in this exchange:  
 
(Fanni, Miskolc, anti): Well, had I asked them to come? Then please come over to me, and be 
here with me, then I do feel responsible and you. But  because I didn't ask them to come, I 
didn't ask these people to come, it is not Europe that asked these people to come, so Europe is 
not responsible  whether they arrive here in health or how they come here. We don’t ask 
them to come, we don’t want them to come here.  
(Ádám, Miskolc, anti): [Nods in agreement]. 
(Balázs, Miskolc, anti): We are not responsible. Why is it my responsibility that they drown at 
sea? Why did they start off on the sea in an inflatable boat? 
 
Nevertheless, for many participants the question of ethical responsibility was fraught 
with dilemmas and no easy answers. Groups often debated the issue by shifting the 
terms of reference of the question from the issue of personal responsibility to that of 
the state and indeed Europe at large. The former was particularly apparent across both 
groups in Munich, where Germany’s ‘complicated past’ (Germany, Jenny, anti) was 
cited by one interviewee as an important backdrop for understanding Chancellor 
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Merkel’s response and the flourishing, at least initially, of the Willkommenskultur. For 
another participant the affluence of Germany, along with ‘the rest of the Western 
world and America in particular’, was the rationale given for its obligation to find 
ways to assist migrant and refugee groups (Germany, Karl, pro). Against this 
backdrop, a number of groups spoke of the ‘importance of helping people, of saving 
lives’ (Germany, Stefanie, pro) and of ‘helping those who are worse off than you’ 
(Germany, Dieter, anti).  
 What emerges from the ‘Border Narratives’ project, therefore, is a rich and 
complex set of narratives that position the figure of the migrant in a highly nuanced 
way; as both a threat to political, economic, societal, and personal security, and as 
threatened by exposure to violence en route to Europe, unnecessarily restrictive 
policies upon entry to Europe, and exposure to racism, xenophobia, and forms of 
physical violence once in Europe. These findings do not support the view that EU 
citizens straightforwardly want tougher border security in response to migration into 
Europe; that is to reduce ‘public opinion’ in ways that ignore complex and often 
contradictory dynamics. Our findings suggest the need for a more calibrated and 
reflective approach and further work on vernacular understandings of migration and 
border security in Europe and beyond; as our analysis has shown, non-elite 
knowledge and expertise has significant implications for conceptualizing ‘the border’ 
among both academic and policy-making communities.  
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